The British perception of Netaji and the I.N.A. by Fay, Peter W.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
THE BRITISH PERCEPTION OF NETAJI AND THE I. N. A. 
Peter Fay 
A talk delivered at the 5th International 
Netaji Seminar, Calcutta January 1985 
HUMANITIES WORKING PAPER 112 
April 1985 
THE BRITISH PERCEPTION OF NETAJI AND THE I. N. A. 
A talk delivered at the 5th International Netaji Seminar 
Calcutta, January 1985 
Peter W. Fay 
California Institute of Technology 
It is presumptuous of an American who, though old enough to 
have had direct personal experience of Subhas Chandra Bose and the Azad 
Hind Fauj, in fact has had none; who, being American, cannot bring to 
the topic the familiarity, the passion, the commitment which so many of 
you here display; it is presumptuous of such a one to attempt to say 
anything to you about Netaji and the Indian National Army. But I have 
one excuse. Perceptions are everybody's game. 
Were I to announce that I possessed, and intended to convey, 
"the truth" about Netaji, that wQul.!i be an impertinence, an outrage 
nearly. For I do not believe that "the truth" about a man, a woman, a 
movement, is ascertainable -- even, perhaps, exists. We can certainly 
establish the factuality, the authenticity, of gyents. We can 
establish, for example, that Netaji was born eighty-eight years ago 
this month, was rusticated from Presidency College after the assault on 
Oaten, and at Fitzwilliam Hall read simultaneously for the Tripos and 
the I. C. S. examinations. We can establish that he was of such and 
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such a height, that the probable cause of much of his physical 
discomfort was his gallbladder, and that in 1944 very few people on 
this side of the world, perhaps no one at all except Abid Hassan and 
Lakshmi Swaminadhan, knew that he was married. But having established 
these things, and many more, what do we have? Surely not "the truth" 
about Netaj i. 
For what we mean by the truth is not that we have all the 
facts straight. What we mean is that, having possessed ourselves of 
some of these facts, the significant ones, we move on to an 
appropriate, a just, appreciation of the man and his life. What we 
mean is that we (to use a common American colloquialism) size him up 
right. And that is a matter of perception. 
Moreover, it is forever an open matter. Perceptions, unlike 
facts, are not fixed. They cannot be framed and hung on a wall, like 
those imposing oil portraits of great men (among them Nehru, B. C. Roy, 
and Subhas himself with no date of death, as if that fact was still 
not established) -- those oil portraits that I remember seeing some 
years ago in the Victoria Memorial right here in this city. In England 
and in the States too it is common for men and women who have given 
money for the construction of some useful building -- a laboratory, 
say, at my own California Institute of Technology -- to have their 
portraits hung in the completed buildings. It rarely works; a portrait 
is not a perception; the people who use the building forget, or never 
knew, and rarely care. who the figure is. Only if the person portrayed 
lives on in memory is the portrait of any effect. And memories differ, 
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being shaped by who is doing the remembering and in what circumstances. 
What I propose to do in this short talk is suggest some of the ways in 
which the British remember, or if you will perceive, Netaji and his 
movement. 
* * * 
Let me begin, because it is the most recent specimen. with the 
famous (or infamous) Granada documentary of a year ago. I should 
explain that I have not actually seen this piece of work. It is not 
being shown in the States, though Granada's serialization of Scott's 
~ Quartet (which it was meant to introduce) has just now reached our 
screens. But I have read the script; and I am aware. by word of mouth 
and from newspaper clippings, what many persons here and elsewhere in 
India think of it -- or at least thought. Namely, that while it 
purports to rescue Netaji from the relative obscurity in which he 
languishes outside India, it actually (in the words ascribed to Dr. 
Bose by the Sunday Statesmanl ) "denigrates him at every turn." Again 
with the caveat that I have only the script to go by, allow me to say 
that I agree that it does denigrate him and his movement. How? By 
being so constructed that the viewer. the British viewer (for whom 
after all it is intended), is not given the leisure as it were, the ten 
or fifteen minutes of viewing time, in which to get to know Netaji and 
the men and women he led in their own place and context. Long before 
that viewer discovers who these uncommon people were and exactly what 
it was that they were doing -- remember that the very existence, during 
the war years, of a Provisional Government and a National Army is known 
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today to few Englishmen and even fewer Americans -- Granada pairs their 
chief with Adolf Hitler; with that somber and malignant figure whose 
name, after forty years, still speaks so powerfully to the West's 
consuming anxiety in the Second World War; and by pairing him so, 
practically guarantees that Englishmen and other Westerners who 
encounter Subhas only in this television documentary will remember him 
not with the sympathetic curiosity and incipient respect it was 
presumably Granada's intention to excite, but with suspicion, perhaps 
even with loathing. Relentlessly the connection is developed: Bose 
spending the greater part of his European sojourns in Germany, Bose 
accepting an engraved cigarette case from Hitler's hands, Bose taking a 
woman secretly to wife, a German-speaking woman, an Eva Braun no less. 
Reading the script, you are bound to wonder why Granada did not instead 
equate Netaji with Cromwell or Garibaldi; why they did not pair him 
with Castro or Nasser; why they did not measure him against Mustapha 
Kemal Ataturk -- a figure, by the way, whom Bose explicitly admired? 
The reason is not, I think, that the producers were seriously 
interested in the question "was Netaji a fascist?" Nor were David 
Boulton and the others, I believe, dragged in Hitler's direction by 
Nirad Chaudhuri. It was, I will admit, curious that the one Indian 
outside the ranks of the I. N. A. or Netaji's own family whom Granada 
chose to make a part of the documentary should have been that clever 
old expatriate; and it borders, I will add, on the outrageous that 
Chaudhuri should try to persuade us that what drove Subhash through 
most of his life, and particularly in the last weeks before his fatal 
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flight, was not love of India, or courage in the face of adversity, or 
anything else constructive, but only hatred of British rule, a hatred 
so intense and persistent that it threatened to consume him. Surely, 
however, those of you who accepted Granada's invitation, went to 
England, and were interviewed, discovered that as always happens in 
these cases only a fraction of what you said got into the finished 
piece. Hugh Toye. who knows Chaudhuri well (they live almost side by 
side), assures me that they filmed Chaudhuri for forty-five minutes, 
and from those forty-five minutes selected only five. The question 
really, then, is why those particular five? 
To answer that question it will be useful, I think, to remind 
ourselves how the Second World War appeared to Englishmen when it was 
being fought. It was in name, of course, a "world war". And unlike 
its predecessor of 1914 to 1918, it was fought right across the 
Eurasian land mass, involved the Pacific Ocean more than it did the 
Atlantic, and finished with an Allied triumph not over a European power 
but over Japan. Nevertheless to Englishmen, to Frenchmen and Poles and 
many Italians and every Dutchman and Dane; to Americans too; the 
critical field of battle was Europe. The war had begun there. It had 
begun, in 1939, with a deliberate Nazi challenge to the very fabric of 
civilized life. It had very nearly been lost the following year by a 
combination of mismanagement and default; had been kept alive only by 
England's stubborn refusal to capitulate; and would be won when Nazi 
Germany was at last smashed. In this contest for the possession of 
civilized society's body and soul what happened in Asia could never be 
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much more than a distraction, a sort of enormous and disquieting 
irrelevance. Japan's entry into the fighting, like Italy's earlier but 
of course on a much larger and more dangerous scale, appeared as an act 
of the grossest opportunism, a monstrous and unforgivable diversion, 
for which she would be duly punished when the work of saving 
civilization was accomplished. The civilization in question was 
European. It would be saved, if it could be saved at all, in Europe. 
What happened in the Pacific theatre, in China, on the borders of 
India, had no significance beyond their effect on the war in Europe 
with the odd consequence that even the most chilling disasters to 
Allied forces in that part of the world, even the attack on Pearl 
Harbor and the loss of Singapore, struck "us" (I might as well be frank 
about the pronoun) as inconclusive. Thrown out of this place or that 
by the Japanese, "we" knew (with MacArthur) that we would return. When 
the real business of the war, the European business, was finished, we 
should come back to Asia. And then everything would be as it had been 
before. Or if there had to be changes, as for example in India where 
some sort of dominion status would have to be arranged, it would be 
seen that the war had had nothing to do with it; Japanese victories 
had had nothing to do with it. They were an interruption, a damned 
nuisance of an interruption. which far from initiating or accelerating 
those changes had actually prevented us from getting on with them. 
I have just given you, a bit exaggerated of course, a little 
too pat (in particular. many Americans will object that I have allowed 
us to be represented exlusively by the east coast liberal elite), how 
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the war appeared in the west; indeed, how the war appeared to me 
personally -- for I see no reason to conceal my perception of things. 
When Colonel Sahgal left Rangoon in January of 1945 to command a 
regiment in the Mount Popa area of central Burma, I was about to sail 
(a very young second lieutenant) for Naples with a battalion of 8-inch 
howitzers. And when Colonel Sahgal surrendered to the British on the 
banks of the Irrawaddy at the end of April, I was in the Po Valley 
watching Germans give themselves up -- and with every expectation of 
being sent next to Okinawa or some other Pacific island. Had someone 
told me then that Indians were fighting with the Japanese against the 
English, I would have been surprised and disgusted. In fact no one 
told my any such thing, it was years before the name "Netaji" or the 
letters I. N. A. meant anything to me. And name and letters mean 
nothing to most Americans and Englishmen now. So along comes Granada. 
with the laudable intention of resurrecting the name and the letters 
for an audience of Britishers whom it wishes to lure to its television 
serialization of Paul Scott's novels. And these Britishers, remember, 
perceive the Second World War and Britain's part in it in the manner I 
have just sketched. 
They perceive something more. They perceive that in the years 
since, they have lost almost all the tangible fruits of their effort 
and of their victory; have lost everything beyond their shores except 
Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands; and have become as poor as the 
Irish -- much poorer than the French. They perceive, to put it 
differently, that they are no longer Britishers (I use the Indianism 
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deliberately, because it is also an Americanism familiar to us from ~ 
War of Independence. and therefore helps put me in the proper frame of 
mind) -- they perceive that they are no longer Britishers compelling 
the world's attention and respect with their British Empire, they are 
only Englishmen -- Little Englanders. But they have not forgotten what 
they once had and once were. And what combines in their memory, a 
propos the war and the empire, is the Britain of the Battle of Britain, 
Spitfires against ME 109s above the white cliffs of Dover. and in the 
North African desert New Zealanders, South Africans, and -- yes --
Indian regiments drawn from the subcontinent's finest and most loyal 
"martial races". That, and not the stern, unbending Empire of the 
Gateway, the Viceroy's Palace, and the Jallianwala Bagh. is their image. 
Give us if you must this Bengali rebel and his tatterdemalion 
army, but do not break our nostalgic reverie, says Granada's 
prospective audience; as audiences all across England (and in the 
States too) have been saying to the producers of those other film and 
television spectaculars among which The Far Pavilions is said to be the 
worst and the David Lean production of Passage 1£ India the latest. 
Just recently I was shown a bitter indictment of this days-of-the-Raj 
genre by Salman Rushdie, the author of Midnight's Children. "The 
recrudescence of imperialist ideology and the popularity of Raj 
fictions," he writes, "puts one in mind of the phantom twitchings of an 
amputated limb.,,2 In the Granada documentary the limb that twitches is 
gallant 1 itt Ie England standing alone against the "Nazees" in the 
summer of 1940. That, I think, is why the producers picked out of 
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Chaudhuri's forty-five minutes the bit about Netaji, in August of 1945, 
dying "out of mere folly, out of mere hatred of British rule which he 
had created within himself." For hatred. we will probably all agree, 
is what drove Hitler. It is hatred that distinguished him from the 
Garibaldis, the Nassers, and the Ataturks of recent memory; who, if 
they identified enemies and roundly attacked them, also loved and 
fought for what they loved. Hitler the hater. Bose the hater: the 
equation relieved Granada of the necessity of exploring Netaji and the 
I. N. A. outside the context of England and the war. If these Indians 
were for nothing, only against; if what drove them to ally themselves 
first with the Germans. later with the Japanese. was not their Indian-
ness, not their hopes and ambitions for India, but only their bitter 
dislike of Britishers and British rule; then they could the easier be 
treated as just another of England's antagonists, as simply one more 
among the many enemies of truth and decency -- that truth and decency 
for which England, by her refusal to give up the fight in Europe, could 
clearly be seen to speak. Netaji becomes, then, a sort of South Asian 
Hitler manque (a parallel which, by the way, Chaudhuri tentatively drew 
years ago in a journal article3 ). Thus is he denigrated. 
* * * 
But the British perception of Netaji as a hating person is not 
confined to the Granada piece. Let us look again for a moment at the 
incident in Presidency College in Subhas's third year, the Oaten 
business, to which a portion of the 1st International Netaji Seminar 
twelve years ago was devoted. It will not be necessary for me to 
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remind you of the facts of the case: Oaten the Englishman bursting out 
of his lecture hall on the 10th of January, 1916, because there is 
noise in the corridor, and giving a student a shove; Oaten bursting out 
again on the 15th of February and seizing a student by the scruff of 
the neck; Oaten attacked and knocked to the ground on the staircase 
before the college notice board later that afternoon; Subhas, neither 
admitting nor denying a part in the assault, sent down. Netaji 
himself, in later life, made a good deal of this incident. In 1937, in 
the course of dictating his truncated autobiography to Emilie Schenkl, 
he remarked that he had come to realise "the inner signif icance of the 
tragic events of 1916. My Principal had expelled me, but he had made. 
my future career. I had established a precedent for myself from which 
I could not easily depart in future.,,4 What that precedent was (it 
does not appear from the balance of Subhas's words to Emilie, which are 
uncharacteristically woolly) I will suggest in a moment. My question 
now is: what did the British think it was? 
We have one answer from the Englishman whose enthusiasm for 
and close study of Netaji led to the publication, thirty years ago. of 
the first biography by a non-Indian. I refer to Hugh Toye's The 
Springing Tiger, long now out of print in England but still to be found 
on Indian bookstalls under the Jaico imprint. According to Colonel 
Toye, Subhas came out of the Oaten affair believing himself "a victim 
of racial prejudice, struck down for protesting against an insult to 
his Motherland." He did not forget the injury, continues Toye. "He 
brooded over it with all the vehemence of his 19 years," adding to it 
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other examples of racial prejudice, until at last "racial hatred ate 
into his soul." And it is Toye's view that although this "racial 
complex" moderated as Bose grew older, it never went away. "To show 
himself superior to the white-faced foreigner," to so manage things 
that India as a whole should show itself superior, became the object of 
his life, his mission, his -- and here Toye borrows a phrase from Dilip 
Roy - "one-pointed aim."S 
Now one may agree with Toye, and Dilip too, that Subhas was 
unusually single-minded. Dilip himself has him announce at one point 
in his Cambridge stay that Indian students up at the varsity must 
"prove it home" to the English "that we are their superiors.,,6 But 
that is a conversational remark reconstructed, like the others in 
Dilip's memoir, long after it was uttered; and one that seems to me of 
little importance; any high-spirited young man set down in a foreign 
place might say such a thing. There is, by the way, another remark 
from Netaji's Cambridge days that is often made much of -- in my 
opinion equally mistakenly. In a letter to his friend Hementa Sarkar 
enumerating some of the good qualities of the English (they are 
precise, energetic, optimistic, and understand the value of time) 
Subhas observes that "nothing makes me happier than to be served by 
the whites and to watch them clean my shoes.,,7 He refers no doubt to 
the college servants, middle-aged men of a certain class who made the 
beds, swept the rooms, and emptied the chamber pots of Oxford and 
Cambridge undergraduates right through the Second World War and beyond. 
The mental picture bothers most Americans. I remember very well how 
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upset I was my first few days at Balliol when my scout, a man of fifty 
who dressed as carefully as my own father and might have passed for him 
so far as I could see, insisted that I leave my shoes outside my door 
each night so he could have them shined and ready for me when I woke up 
in the morning. But I do not believe it bothered Subhas, or any other 
Indian of status; for him, I think. there was nothing in the least 
interesting, and certainly nothing degrading to the doer, in a servant 
cleaning shoes; he did not sit and watch the man, pleased that a 
fir~n&i would thus abase himself before an Indian. He was simply glad 
that in England, so unlike what he had experienced in Calcutta, 
Englishmen were prepared to treat him as the gentleman he knew himself 
to be -- he found this to be so in the bookshops, and on the trains. 
Let me return to the Oaten business. Subhas met the first 
offense by organizing a student strike. He met the second by leading, 
or being present at, or at the very least refusing to denounce -- the 
evidence is conflicting, Netaji himself so far as I know would never 
say -- the assault before the notice board. And what is one to think 
of the assault? I know what I myself first thought: how unsporting to 
outnumber a man. knock him down, and run! (Probably no Englishman 
failed to notice that what poor Oaten had gone down to the board to 
post was a cricket notice.) But I have thought a bit about it since. 
These young Presidency students had been subjected, as Indians in 
general had been subjected since Macaulay's Education Minute of almost 
a century before. to a steady drumfire of cultural disparagement. The 
Committee of Enquiry set up after the affair was over, three Englishmen 
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and two Indians, agrees that this was the case. So does Tagore, in an 
otherwise mild and patient piece that appeared in April. The 
disparagement had embittered them. The shoving and grabbing by the 
scruff of the neck had been the last straw. What were they to do? How 
were they to recover their self-respect? 
The English demanded -- it is implicit in Toye's treatment. 
and in my own first reaction to the story -- a sporting reply. But if 
one side of the sporting coin tells a man not to hit his enemy from 
behind, the other tells him to offer a challenge face to face, then 
fight with fists or other manly weapons -- and how on earth was an 
Indian student to manage that? Was he to take lessons in boxing (which 
Principal James, rather a decent man, sometimes gave lessons in, 
Hemendranath Das Gupta says); lessons in boxing, the epee, or the 
quarterstaff, then confront Oaten outside his blessed lecture hall and 
have the matter out? Let any student actually attempt such a thing and 
he would not simply be humiliated allover again. by Oaten laughing and 
turning away (as Oaten surely would); that student would, if he 
persisted and actually struck a blow, be instantly charged with assault 
and battery, and pursued with the full force of the law. No, if you 
wanted physical satisfaction, and these young men did, there was only 
one way to obtain it on a Britisher: the way of surprise and speed and 
anonymity. You had to gang up and jump him, not because that 
guaranteed you victory, but because only in that way could he neither 
refuse to fight, nor single you out and ruin you after the fight was 
over. 
14 
Refuse to fight, decline to accept you as an adversary, laugh 
you away, or if you persist isolate and destroy you -- the predicament, 
perhaps, not just of schoolboys under the Raj but of entire 
independence movements, of ethnic minorities, of women at all times 
almost everywhere. As Colonel Sahgal and his wife Dr. Lakshmi Sahgal 
have often told me, perhaps the greatest problem the Indian National 
Army faced was how to compel others to take it seriously. To recognize 
it for what it was, the armed force of a provisional government of free 
India. To treat its members as custom and the laws of war required. 
This Subhas Chandra Bose managed to accomplish with the Japanese. And 
the "precedent" that he had established for himself as a consequence of 
the Oaten business was, I suggest, what enabled him to do it. What 
others might consider undue sensitivity, touchiness even, Subhas from 
1916 on was determined to make a constant of his behavior. Henceforth 
he would insist that the British, and therefore in due course the 
Japanese, in all matters big and small treat him and his with dignity 
and respect. No matter how promising the opportunity, no matter how 
high the cost, in future he would not touch his cap to them. 
But I suspect that the British of the time read something 
different into Subhas's behavior as a third-year Presidency student, 
and I am confirmed in my suspicion by what Hugh Toye has to say. You 
will remember that I have quoted him as writing that Subhas was 
gradually consumed by racial hatred, and that it was this that drove 
him down the path he took. Now I know Colonel Toye well. He has 
taught us all a great deal about the British in India during the war; 
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like his older compatriot Philip Mason, he was there himself. But I 
think (and this is important to the whole question of how the British 
perceive Netaji and the I. N. A.) that Colonel Toye has inverted what 
actually passed between the Presidency College students and Professor 
Oaten, and between Subhas and the British on any number of occasions. 
For it was the Englishman of that day who felt race, thought 
race, used the word often and publicly. It was the Englishman who, 
encountering an Indian or an Egyptian or a Zulu, and observing that he 
differed, attributed the difference not to circumstance but to blood, 
not to culture or community but to race. It was race Sir John Strachey 
had in mind when, addressing himself to the question should Indians be 
admitted by competitive examination to the higher levels of the public 
service (already they filled the lower levels. Bengalis predominating) 
-- it was race Strachey had in mind when he announced, in the Cambridge 
lectures of 1884 that became for so many years the intellectual pillar 
of the Raj, that the most important part of the competitive examination 
of a young Englishman had in fact been sat and passed for him "by his 
forefathers, who, as we have a right to assume, have transmitted to him 
not only their physical courage, but the powers of independent 
judgment, the decision of character, the habits of thought, and 
generally those qualities that are necessary for the government of men, 
and which have given us our empire. The stock-in-trade with which 
Englishmen start in life is not that of the Bengalis.,,7 The one were 
born with imperial talents and instincts. The other were not. 
It is inconceivable that Oaten. James, and their sort did not 
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share this attitude. If they had not read Strachey they had certainly 
read Kipling; or had heard Curzon, the viceroy who defied Bengal by 
splitting it in two, the imperial proconsul ("Grand Moghul" Netaji 
contemptuously calls him) from whose lips issued on every possible 
occasion the message of his countrymen's special and God-given 
capacity for the evenhanded administration of distant places. What is 
more, not being themselves members of the Indian Civil Service, to 
which Strachey and Curzon specifically referred, and which Lloyd George 
would style the "steel frame" of the Raj just when it was ceasing to 
be; not being themselves prospective proconsuls or even military men, 
but only middleclass English schoolmasters brought out to play an 
imperial part; the Oatens and the Jameses had almost certainly 
discovered that to their sense of racial separateness were joined other 
feelings, disturbing feelings, feelings of irritation and anxiety, of 
resentment that their obvious superiority, the superiority of their 
race, was not conceded by the people among whom they moved. Liking 
Indians was not a simple business. As Tagore gently puts it in the 
piece I have already mentioned, "our complexion, religion, language. 
and habits, are most annoyingly different from theirs."S It was easy 
for Englishmen, in periods of loneliness or general malaise, when 
India's foreignness had grown unbearable and the heat was at its worst, 
to dislike "the natives" (that was the term they used); and quite 
possible in moments of extreme exasperation to pass beyond dislike. We 
cannot of course be certain. Tagore himself was anxious to spare his 
students sour and contemptuous British schoolmasters lest they "enter 
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upon life with their hearts filled with the poison of hatred against 
the English.,,9 But when Oaten burst shouting out of his Presidency 
College lecture hall and confronted the students, among whom we may 
suppose was Subhas, surely it was the Englishman more than the Indian 
who was moved by the fury of "racial hatred." 
That Bose did not hate the British of and for themselves is 
further suggested by the kind words he has for the "rough Scotsman" 
with a heart of gold who taught him infantry drill; for two successive 
superintendents of Mandalay prison (Findlay was "an exceedingly nice 
and straightforward man," Smith much the same); for Sir Stanley 
Jackson. Governor of Bengal; for Irwin (no viceroy since Ripon "had 
adopted such a friendly attitude towards the Indian people"); even for 
Principal James ("I must say in fairness to him that he was very 
popular with the students for protecting them against police 
persecution on several occasions,,).lO There are no kind words for 
Oaten. But I do not think Subhas hated him. not in the sense that 
Chaudhuri intends and Hugh Toye plays with. Oaten simply made Netaji 
angry. From that anger came the determination I have mentioned. the 
determination to be treated by any and all Britishers with dignity and 
respect. In that determination he set his course. 
* * * 
There was another element, I think, in the British perception 
of Netaji. 
Subhas was clever, no doubt. He was a gentleman, though an 
Englishman might qualify the attribute by saying "a gentleman of 
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sorts". (Nothing in the Granada documentary, by the way, seems to me 
more snide than the comment that the Indian National Army fought "a war 
of sorts" for India's independence.) But was he a man? Could any 
educated Bengali be more than the Hurree Babu of Kipling's Kim, which 
every Englishman read; Hurree Babu of the patent leather shoes, the 
blue and white umbrella, and the persistent fearfulness. English 
readers knew nothing of the real Bengali secret service agent Sarat 
Chandra Das, who had reached Lhasa in remote Tibet twenty years before 
Kim was published. Weren't all babus weaklings and cowards? 
Netaji was aware of the charge. Partly he blamed Macaulay for 
it. "the trouble began with Macaulay" he wrotel1 not with the 
Education Minute but with the essay on Warren Hastings, with its famous 
passage about "the Bengalee feeble even to effeminacy" for whom "smooth 
excuses, elaborate tissue of circumstantial falsehood, chicanery, 
perjury, forgery" take the place of more manly weapons. 12 Partly, 
however, Subhas blamed himself. Babu. The word alone carried for him 
a painful freight of implied timidity. "God has given us a pair of 
legs, but we are unable to walk 40/45 miles because we are Babus," he 
complained in an early letter to his mother. We cannot bear the heat, 
we are frightened of the cold, we neglect our bodies and surrender 
physical labor to our servants "because we are Babus.,,13 Other 
figures in the independence movement suffered, it has been argued, from 
this "fear of cowardice".1 4 Gandhi felt it, and escaped not by 
imitating the Englishman's courage (which begins with self-assertion 
and proceeds to physical mastery over an opponent) but by employing and 
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teaching courage which begins with self-control and proceeds to the 
non-violent affirmation of truth. But truth force. satyagraha, applied 
to the pacific yet by no means passive pursuit of swaraj, did not suit 
Subhas. intellectually or emotionally. Neither did the path Aurobindo 
Ghosh followed: revolutionary politics first. meditation and the 
practice of yoga later -- Dilip, who supposed Netaji to be "a mystic in 
essence of his being",IS was nevertheless quite unable to entice his 
friend down to Pondicherry. As for Nirad Chaudhuri, his boast that he 
"picked up the gauntlet thrown down by the English" by mastering their 
language and then compelling their attention through the sheer force of 
his prose,16 would have -- the boast was made after Netaji's death --
would have mades Subhas smile. Subhas took the route of armed strength, 
the route Englishmen may have supposed was their route but was 
actually, I believe, in the Bengali martial tradition -- provided, of 
course, that that tradition could be revived while the Raj existed. 
Now that was not an easy thing to do. Indeed, it seems to me 
quite extraordinary that Subhas, on returning to Calcutta from his 
rustication over the Oaten business, with his family's injunction to 
get on with his degree fresh in his ears, should have joined the 
university's Territorial unit. What a marvelous symbol, too, of what 
was to come, that he and the others should march one day into Fort 
William (which of course was otherwise closed to Indians) feeling as 
they marched "as if we were taking possession of something to which we 
had an inherent right but of which we had been unjustly deprived. ul7 
What was to come was a long time coming. A decade later, at the 
20 
Calcutta session of the Congress, Netaji had to make do with drilling 
Congress Volunteers, a thing Chaudhuri pokes fun at in the documentary, 
a thing Lakshmi's mother Ammu disapproved of (Lakshmi remembers) at the 
time; a thing Lakshmi herself, then a girl of fourteen, found so 
exciting that she stole out early each morning -- they were in Calcutta 
for a concurrent meeting of the All-India Women's Conference -- to 
watch. Fifteen years later still Subhas was again in uniform. And 
this time he and the men and women with him were seriously prepared, at 
last and on behalf of all Indians, to I repeat the phrase -- "to 
take possession of something to which we had an inherent right but of 
which we had been unjustly deprived." To repossess India. And to do 
so not by truth-force but by force of arms. 
* * * 
So I have hurried us clear up to 1943. What was the British 
perception of Subhas in that year? A mixture, I think. Anxiety over 
what he might accomplish: a secret intelligence memorandum of 14 July 
acknowledged his "drive and political acumen, his prestige in Indian 
revolutionary circles, his understanding of both Indian and English 
character."lS Relief that he had not reached Malaya while Quit India 
still threatened. Behind these, I suspect, distaste, reluctance to 
believe that the I. N. A. was a serious business, and a grudging 
suspicion that it might prove to be just that. 
The British had always taken Subhas's revolutionary ambitions 
seriously, too seriously, scenting terrorist connections in his every 
move (as Mihir Bose in his excellent biography has most recently 
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shown), and therefore throwing him into prison more readily and in more 
distant places than other Indian leaders of his rank. But what were 
they to make of this army of his? If there was any reality, any 
substance, to it, it offended reason and the senses in two ways. By 
merely existing, it destroyed the myth of the Indian Army. And by 
following Bose it destroyed the myth of the babu. 
Let me say something only about the first. Philip Mason 
has written a marvelous, nostalgic, disarming history of the Indian 
Army -- I mean, of course, the previous British Indian Army -- which he 
entitles A Matter of Honour. Why does he call it that? Because the 
army he chronicles was not "Indian" in the sense that the Japanese army 
was Japanese; nor could the King-Emperor for whom it fought, being so 
distant and foreign, command its direct and active allegiance; nor was 
it held together (though here Mason may be looking through rose-tinted 
glasses) simply by the mercenary bonds of pay and loot. The cement was 
regimental loyalty, loyalty passing from the men (Indian) through the 
officers (English) to the colors. What held it together was "honour" 
in that sense. 
Let us suppose that for many years this was actually the case. 
Then came the Malayan campaign, the fall of Singapore, and Farrer Park. 
There, on the 17th of February, 1942, the Indians of Percival's 
command, previously separated from their British officers (who were 
marched off to Changi), were handed over to the Japanese by a Colonel 
Hunt, addressed by Mohan Singh, and summoned to join a truly Indian 
army -- the Indian National Army; which many, by word and gesture, did 
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on the spot. That broke the myth. That shattered the "honour". And 
the subsequent tortured efforts of New Delhi to demonstrate that the 
joiners had been lured to their "betrayal" by money and comforts, or 
forced to it by (among other things) torture in the literal sense of 
the word, attest to the impact upon British opinion and feelings of the 
break. I do not need to belabor that. What I should like to point 
out, because it did not at first dawn upon me, and because it 
illustrates again how easily the British saw things backward, as with 
who was consumed with racial hatred for whom -- but this kind of thing 
we all of us, surely, do from time to time -- what I want to point out 
is that at Farrer Park the betrayal, the breach of honour. was in fact 
committed not by the Indians at all, but by the British. For it was 
they who abandoned the jawans. "I had a feeling of being completely 
helpless," Shah Nawaz later testified, "of being handed over like 
cattle ••• ;" Dhillon too felt "like one deserted;,,19 Prem Sahgal would 
echo the sentiment had not circumstances put him elsewhere on the 
island at that moment. Yet not once, not even at the Red Fort Trials, 
was an Englishman heard to suggest that Percival should have refused to 
let himself and the rest of the British be separated from their Indian 
brothers-in-arms; or that Hunt, on coming to the microphone, should 
have refused to announce what he announced. As it was, what these 
Indian soldiers, whose discipline and loyalty Malaya Command had no 
reason to doubt, and who had fought for their regiments and their King-
Emperor some of them (like Prem) the full length of the peninsula 
what these soldiers perceived was the deliberate, formal, one might 
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almost say ceremonial abdication of a responsibility. In good times, 
in victorious times, the two races (to use the British term) of the 
Indian Army were bound to each other in "a matter of honour." Now, 
however, the times were bad. So the Britisher was backing out. 
And so, abruptly, and leaving things much in the air, I come 
to the end of the argument. What is the British perception of Netaji 
and the I. N. A.? Cloudy, I would suggest. Inverted. which is a 
variety of being wrong. Finally and most obviously, incomplete. It is 
an incompleteness that comes in part from just refusing to look. Do 
you know what happened to Netaji in British publications during the 
war? He disappeared. There is an entry, a fairly long entry. for him 
in the 1940-41 edition of the Indian Year l!Q.Qk and Who's Who. There is 
an entry for 1941-42, ending with "mysteriously disappeared from his 
house in 1940, present whereabouts not known." The next edition 
contains the same entry, without elaboration; the next after that, and 
the next after that still, have no entry at all. It is as if, like 
Trotsky 
analogy 
and we must give Granada Television credit for drawing the 
it is as if Subhas, like Trotsky, had been quite "painted 
out of the picture." How is one to take that, particularly when it 
still goes on? 
Perhaps as a backhanded acknowledgement of his importance and 
intractability. In the end it may be this that is most revealing about 
the British and Netaji. They could not and cannot manage him. Even 
Sir Richard Attenborough, I see, does not know what to do with him; and 
not knowing, leaves him out of his magnificent film. 
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